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Abstract. Building a safety case is a common approach to make expert judge-
ment explicit about safety of a system. The issue of confidence in such argumen-
tation is still an open research field. Providing quantitative estimation of confi-
dence is an interesting approach to manage complexity of arguments. This paper
explores the main current approaches, and proposes a new model for quantitative
confidence estimation based on Belief Theory for its definition, and on Bayesian
Belief Networks for its propagation in safety case networks.
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1 Introduction
Safety cases are used in several critical industrial sectors to justify safety of installations
and operations. As defined in the standard [6]: "a Safety Case is a structured argument,
supported by a body of evidence, that provides a compelling, comprehensible and valid
case that a system is safe for a given application in a given environment". An important
research work has also been initiated to deliver guidelines to document safety cases.
An initial work developed at York University [19], based on an adaptation of Toulmin
argumentation model [25], led to the proposal of the Goal Structuring Notation (GSN).
Other proposals such as CAE for Claims-Argument-Evidence [3] and KAOS (Knowl-
edge Acquisition and autOmated Specification) [5], but they did not reach the maturity
of GSN [14]. The Object Management Group (OMG) has also delivered a metamodel
for the argumentation approach [22]. The goal of these approaches is to make more
explicit the supporting arguments for a top-level claim.
Given a claim and a supporting argument, an important and growing issue is to un-
derstand how much confidence one could have in the claim and how the different argu-
ments contribute to such confidence. For instance, let us consider the classical example
of the claim "{System X} is safe", supported by the evidence that all specific hazards
have been eliminated as presented in Figure 1. Main concepts of GSN are presented
here: goals present claims forming part of the argument; Strategies describe the nature
of inferences that exist between a goal and its supporting sub-goal(s); Solutions present
a reference to an evidence item (results of a fault tree analysis for instance); Contexts
present contextual artifacts (they could be a reference to contextual information, or
statements). Other elements are used in GSN but not presented here as our proposal
focuses on these main components of GSN. Each element of such an argument may
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be subject of uncertainties, such as "do all the hazards have been identified?" or "is the
treatment of hazard n effective?". Moreover, considering that argument structures tend
to grow excessively, it may become too complex for third parties to analyse the argu-
ment. Therefore, appropriate methods to assess confidence in the argument structures
and supporting evidence are required. Three main challenges are of particular interest:
how confidence could be formally defined, how confidence could be quantitatively esti-
mated, and how confidence in argument leaves could be propagated to assess the impact
on the main claim confidence.
In this paper we mainly address the first and third issues by introducing a new
method for defining and propagating a quantitative estimation of confidence of a safety
case. After presenting related work in Section 2, we introduce our definition of confi-
dence based on belief theory in Section 4. This definition is used in Section 5 where
details about confidence propagation are given. Finally, in the conclusion we will dis-
cuss about first results and open issues in this area.
S1 : Argument by 
claiming addressed 
all identified 
plausible hazards
G2 : {Hazard H1} has 
been addressed
Goal
G1 : {System X} is 
safe
Goal
Strategy
G3 : {Hazard H2} has 
been addressed
Goal
… Gn : {Hazard Hn} has been addressed
Goal
isSupportedBy
C1: List of identified 
hazards for {System X}
Context
Sn1: 
reference to 
an evidence 
item
Solution
Sn3: 
reference to 
an evidence 
item
SnX: 
reference to 
an evidence 
item
Sn4: 
reference to 
another 
evidence 
item
inContextOf
Fig. 1. GSN example adapted from Hazard Avoidance Pattern [20]
2 Related Work
The issue of confidence in argument structures has already been addressed by several
works, with slightly different objectives and scopes. Table 1 presents a common frame-
work to analyze some relevant related work considering the following dimensions:
– Argument modelling: construction of the "case" which may be based on GSN or
other notations
– Argument uncertainties identification: uncertainties in inferences and arguments
elements are identified
– Confidence modelling: construction of a confidence case, with explicit representa-
tion of dependencies between the uncertainties
– Confidence estimation: theoretical framework for quantitative estimation of the
confidence
– Decision support: provide support based on the quantitative estimation in order to
make a decision for the acceptability of the argument, or its improvement.
Table 1. Different approaches for managing confidence in safety case
Argument
modelling
Argument
uncertainties
identification
Confidence
modelling
Confidence
estimation
Decision support
[21] Bayesian network Probability law
[26] Argumentation
Metamodel (ARM)
based case
Based on Toulmin
model
Bayesian network
(with Hitchcock
criteria)
Probability law
(with basic logical
gates)
[7] GSN Bayesian network Probability law and
tool support with
AgenaRisk
[4] Trust case based
on Toulmin model
Dempster-Shafer
Theory
Decision level
associated to
confidence level
[2] GSN Dempster-Shafer
Theory
Decision based on
the confidence
value
[1] GSN Common
Characteristic Map
(CCM)
Confidence case
based on GSN
[13] GSN Based on
Assurance Claim
Points (ACP)
Confidence case in
GSN
Baconian
probability
[16] GSN Based on
Assurance Claim
Points (ACP)
Assurance case in
GSN
Qualitative Approaches
In [16], the inventors of GSN address the confidence issue, by proposing to split a
traditional safety case in two pieces. The first is the safety argument, showing all evi-
dences, and the second is a confidence argument that addresses confidence in evidences,
contexts, and individual inferences. This confidence argument is also represented with
GSN. It starts by adding to the safety case some possible uncertainty sources, which are
called Assurance Claim Points (ACP), that are attached to inferences (the arrows con-
necting claims), contexts (explanatory information), or solutions. Then, for each ACP,
an argumentation mainly focuses on demonstrating that the ACP is trustworthy and ap-
propriate, which is built using GSN. Another proposal [1], is based on the ACP but only
focuses on Context and Solution elements. The authors propose to use a map (Common
Characteristic Map) as a check list to identify sources of uncertainties, with recursive
dependencies. For instance, if a safety case includes a solution which is a "Process re-
sult", they propose the generic uncertainties related to "the use of a language", "the use
of a tool", "the use of a mechanism", "the involved artifacts", etc. All those characteris-
tics are then refined, with possible recursive dependencies.
The proposed approach in [12] is quite similar, adapting the defeater concept from
Defeasible Reasoning theory introduced by [24]. These defeaters that could be com-
pared to previous ACP, or weaknesses in the argumentation, are then analyzed to be
reduced one by one.
Both previous proposals focus on the identification of the weaknesses in an argu-
mentation, and present methods for a well structured approach. Nevertheless, such ap-
proaches may lead to complex confidence cases. Although controversial, we believe
that quantitative estimation approaches may help to analyze the safety case confidence.
For instance, it can support sensitivity analyses to identify the weak elements of an
argumentation.
Quantitative Approaches
This group of approaches tries to apply mathematical formalism to capture lack of
confidence in argument elements. Apart from some proposals based on simple math-
ematical models as in [13] where the number of uncertainties is estimated, two main
ways of approaching the problem can be identified:
– Bayesian Belief Networks (BBNs): in this case the uncertainty is interpreted as a
probability. BBNs are then applied to deduce the confidence in a goal from cred-
ibility of its backing arguments. Some authors directly use BBNs for modeling
arguments and confidence. For instance, in [18], they only use BBNs and com-
mercial tools to calculate "trustworthy", which is actually a conditional probability.
With a similar approach, authors of [21] particularly focus on the diversification in
argumentation, calculating how a "multilegged" argument (a claim is supported by
two evidences) impacts the probability (interpreted as a confidence level) of achiev-
ing the main claim. However, they directly use BBNs, without any safety case. On
the contrary, [26] propose to apply to each claim of a Toulmin model argument, a
Bayesien network pattern showing relationships between uncertainties in the argu-
mentation based on Hitchock criteria [17]. However, confidence propagation is not
clearly analyzed and justified. In [7], the authors present an interesting approach to
build a BBN from the safety case, and use the work of [11], to define a distribution
of confidence for each argument element, but they do not propose transformation
rules between safety case in GSN and the confidence BBN. The confidence propa-
gation formulas are also not justified.
– Dempster–Shafer (D-S) theory of evidence. These approaches are based on the be-
lief theory developed by P. Dempster in 1967, and extended by G. Shafer in 1976. A
common justification for its use, is that probability theory does not make difference
between epistemic and aleatory uncertainties [10]. In the D-S approach, belief, dis-
belief and epistemic uncertainty are explicitly quantified. An important work by [4]
is based on this theory. The authors, propose to build "Trust cases" based on Toul-
min concepts, and to directly associate levels for belief and uncertainties, linked
with a decision to accept or not an argument element. In this case, they do not build
a confidence case, but directly propose a method and a tool for decision support.
As presented later, they do not explicitly take into account confidence in the in-
ferences of the argument. Authors of [2], directly reuse the previous work, with a
limited version, only considering that for each argument element it exists a level
for "sufficiency".
In summary, defining and measuring confidence in assurance claims is an impor-
tant and open issue. A framework for determining confidence is needed, and this paper
presents some initial steps to fulfill this objective.
3 Proposed Approach Overview
Our objective is to propose a method to identify weaknesses in safety case, in order
to improve it. Referring to Table 1, our contribution focuses on the following steps
presented Figure 2:
– Argument modelling: the safety case is built using GSN
– Confidence modelling: we propose to annotate the GSN models and transform them
into a confidence network
– Confidence estimation: confidence in the network leaves are estimated and propa-
gation formulas are used
– Sensitivity analysis: impact of confidence variations is analyzed to identify weak-
nesses of the safety case.
Argument modelling
(safety case in GSN)
Confidence 
modelling
and estimation
Sensitivity Analysis
(Tornado graph)
modifications
Fig. 2. Overview of the proposed method
4 Measuring Confidence
Confidence may be used as a common concept for different theories, including prob-
ability, and D-S. As in [1, 4], we define confidence using the D-S approach. In this
theory, a belief function is defined from the powerset P(Ω) of possible events into
[0; 1]. For instance, let ω be the state of an indicator light that can have two values on
and off , then Ω = {on, off} and P(Ω) = {{on}, {off}, {on, off},∅}. In this ex-
ample the belief function Bel, is defined as the mass m of belief such as Bel({on})
represents the credibility of the light to be ON . As an example, a possible estima-
tion would be Bel({on}) = m({on}) = 0.2, Bel({off}) = m({off}) = 0.5 et
m({on, off}) = m(Ω) = 0.3. When events are Boolean, like in this example, we can
sum-up the D-S concepts with the Figure 3 (Plausibility is another D-S concept which
will not be included in this paper).
disbelief
Bel(¬A)
belief 
Bel(A)
uncertain
1
plausible 
Pl(A)
Fig. 3. D-S theory concepts, with a Boolean set
We will consider in a safety case that all elements leaves are observed, and that they
cannot be false. Hence, for an element A, Bel(A) = 0. This led us to define confidence
and uncertainty as the belief functions:
m(A) = Bel(A) = g(A) ∈ [0, 1] : confidence
m(A,A) = 1− g(A) ∈ [0, 1] : uncertainty
m(A) = 0
(1)
In the context of safety case, we consider two types of uncertainty sources, which
are similar to those presented in [16] named "appropriateness" and "trustworthiness".
For instance, in the very simple safety case presented in Figure 4, two sources of uncer-
tainties may be identified:
– uncertainty in the fact that B is appropriate for the inference "A is Supported by B"
– uncertainty in the solution B itself : are the tests trustworthy?
A
System is acceptably 
safe
B
Tests are 
conclusive
Goal
Solution
Uncertainty in “B supports A”
Uncertainty in Solution B
?
?
Fig. 4. Uncertainty points in a simple inference
5 Propagating Confidence
5.1 Argument Types
The very basic inference is the simplest one, "A is Supported by B". Nevertheless, most
of arguments are more complex than direct one-to-one inference. For instance, let us
consider the example presented with the main claim "A: System is fit for use", supported
by both "B: Tests are conclusive" and "C: Formal verification has been performed".
In that case, we can expect that both evidences independently increase the level of
confidence in A. This concept is presented as "alternative argument" in [4]: even if
there is no confidence in B, the fact that C also independently supports A will preserve
some level of confidence.
An another form of inference, is presented in the GSN «Hazard Avoidance Pattern»
proposed in [20], presented Figure 1. In that case, the main Goal "System is Safe",
depends on all the sub goals together (we do not consider "Strategy" as a node, because
it is only a descriptive element). Each of the premises covers a part of the goal. [4]
propose to name such an argument a "complementary argument".
Figure 5 present those two types of arguments, with the inference "A supported
by B and C". We also illustrate the fact that in both types of argument, the sub nodes
may have a different weight in the overall confidence in the claim A. Other types of
arguments may be included, as introduced in [2, 4], but they are not included in this
paper.
Alternative argument
With same weight
(B or C justify the 
main claim A)
With different weights
(C justifies the main
claim A , B partly 
supports A)
B
C
Complementary argument
With same weight
With different weights
A
A
BC
A
A
C
C B
B
Fig. 5. Alternative and complementary arguments
5.2 Simple Argument
The basic inference, "A is supported by B" can apply to the cases (a) a goal is refined
into a subgoal and (b) a goal is supported by an evidence, as presented in Figure 6. In
this case, the confidence network is represented like a BBN, using two nodes and one
edge. We propose to use the following table to describe the confidence propagation:
g(B) 0 1
g(A) 0 p
AB
Goal
Solution
A
Goal
B
Goal
B
A
Confidence networkSafety case in GSN
(a) (b)
Fig. 6. (a) GSN Simple argument transformation into confidence network and (b) g(A) in func-
tion of g(B), for p ∈ [0; 1]
In this table, the confidence in A is estimated when there is no confidence in B (i.e.
when g(B) = 0), then g(A) = 0, and when there is a maximum confidence in g(B). In
this case, the confidence in A depends on a factor p, which represents the confidence in
the inference "A is supported by B". The final confidence is obtained using this table as
a probability table: g(A) = p∗g(B). The result is a linear dependency g(A), illustrated
in Figure 6 considering different values for p and g(B).
5.3 Alternative Arguments
As presented Figure 5, several arguments may support a claim with an independent in-
fluence. It is important to note that in this Figure, we do not represent the confidence,
but the way each argument supports the main claim. In this case, the confidence in A,
may be increased by the confidence in both B and C. Such approach could be applied to
Solutions or sub-goals as presented Figure 7. The Strategy node is not part of the con-
fidence network, as it only gives explanations on the choices made for argumentation.
We chose for this argument type to use a leaky noisy-or as defined in probability
theory [8]. It was originally introduced in [23], and it is based on a logical OR between
parent nodes (Yi) and a child node(X), but it includes the fact that the relationship
between parents and the child node are not necessary deterministic. The leaky effect
corresponds to the fact that even when both parents (B and C) have 0-value probability,
there is still a "leaky" probability for the child node. For probabilities, the mathematical
function is, with Yv the set of Yi in state {True}:
P (X = {True}|Yi) = 1− (1− l) ∗
∏
Yi∈Yv
(1− pi) (2)
with pi = P (X|Yi, {Yi}j 6=i). In its application to confidence, we do not consider the
leaky effect, it is indeed obvious that if there is no confidence in B and C (g(B) =
g(C) = 0), then the confidence in A is zero, i.e. g(A) = 0. Consequently, we obtain
the following equation:
g(X|Yi) = 1−
∏
Yi∈Yv
(1− pi) (3)
AC
A
B
B
A
GSN safety case Confidence Network
B
C
A
B C
C
SolutionSolution
Goal
Strategy
Goal Goal
Goal Goal
Goal Goal
<<alternative>>
<<alternative>>
<<alternative>>
Fig. 7. Alternative argumentation transformation into confidence network
According to 3, the resulting table for two parents is:
g(B) 0 1
g(C) 0 1 0 1
g(A) 0 q p 1-(1-p)(1-q)
This leads to the confidence formula g(A) = p∗g(B)+q∗g(C)−g(B)∗g(C)∗p∗q.
p and q respectively represent the confidence in A in case one only has confidence in B
or C. Figure 8 illustrates the evolution of confidence g(A) for different situations:
– Figure (a) where p = q = 1 illustrates that increasing the confidence in g(B) alone
or g(C) alone, automatically increases g(A). For instance, for g(C) = 0.75 and
g(B) = 0.5, the resulting confidence is 0.875. Confidence of 1 for A, occurs only
if g(B) or g(C) reaches 1.
– Figure (b) shows influence of p on g(A). For a low confidence p in the inference
"A is supported by B", the confidence in A only depends on confidence in C (g(A)
is constant for p = 0).
– Figure (c) shows that for a low value of g(C) (0.1), the variation of q, which is the
confidence in the inference "A supported by C", has no effect on g(A).
5.4 Complementary Arguments
Complementary arguments are used when a set of solutions or subgoals are required
simultaneously for supporting the main goal. However, a weight for each element is
assigned to rate its relative importance. For instance, in the "Hazard Avoidance Pattern",
some hazards may have a less impact on the overall safety, and the lack of confidence in
g(C) ∈[0;1] p ∈[0;1] q ∈[0;1]
(a) (b) (c)
Fig. 8. Alternative argument: g(A), in function of g(B), g(C), p and q
their treatment, may induce less reduction in the main confidence, than for other more
severe hazards. Several models are used in the literature for such arguments, such as
simple And-gate [26], weighted mean [7], or Noisy-And [18]. In our case, after several
simulations, we decided to define our own Noisy-And, to obtain the trends that are
relevant for complementary argumentation. In this case, we based our calculation on the
uncertainty as defined in equation 1 and using the leaky noisy-or defined in equation 2,
but taking for the leak v = 1− l. We then obtain the following confidence table:
m(B,B) 0 1
m(C,C) 0 1 0 1
m(A,A) 1− v 1− v.(1− q) 1− v.(1− p) 1− v.(1− p).(1− q)
To calculate the confidence table, we apply the relation g(X) = 1−m(X,X), and
we also decided to fix g(A) = 0 when g(B) = g(A) = 0 (which should be obtain for
whatever weight of B and C). We thus obtain the following table:
g(B) 1 0
g(C) 1 0 1 0
g(A) v v.(1− q) v.(1− p) 0
One main difference with other research works, lies in the interpretation of the pa-
rameters. In our case, p and q represent the weight of B and C to decrease confidence
(increase uncertainty). In the context of confidence calculation, we also propose to in-
troduce a relation between leak value v, p,and q such as: v = (p+ q)/2. Indeed, when
p and q are lower than 1, it means that the confidence in the inference is less than one.
The generalization of this constraint to a complementary argument with n parents is:
v =
1
n
n∑
i=1
pi (4)
The values in the confidence table are:
g(X|Y1, ..., Yk) = v.
k∏
i=1
(1− pi)
(a) (b) (c)
Fig. 9. Complementary argument: g(A) in function of g(B), p and q
where pi represent the weight of Yi in the argument. We consider in the following
discussion that having a value of 0, for any confidence is not considered, has such
an element (no confidence at all), will be removed from a safety argument. Figure 9
presents the result for 2 parents, B, and C, and one child, A. In (a) and (b) we illustrate
that when q decreases (q=1, q=0.5) then the influence of g(C) decreases. On the figure,
the lines for different values of g(C) are close depending only on g(B) (with a value of
0.5, not presented here due to limitation space). We also illustrate in (b), that when p and
q are less than 1, we obtain a residual confidence when g(B) = 0 and g(C) > 0. This is
actually an expected result, because, when the weights are less than one, this means that
the argument is not a perfect AND gate. In (c), p is low (0.1), which is interpreted as a
low influence of g(B), and characterized by the fact that all lines are nearly horizontals
(i.e. with no influence of g(B)). A complete analysis of limits, which is not presented
here, has demonstrated that the variations of g(A) are compliant with a complementary
argument [9].
5.5 Mixed Arguments
The previous arguments could be used also to integrate the confidence in the GSN "Con-
text" element. Indeed, a context is actually a complementary element for the considered
argument. Figure 10 presents a complementary argument, where a context has also been
defined. In this case, the resulting network, is a node A, with three parents (B, C, D),
and a noisy-and table for node A. When an alternative argument is used between B and
C, then, an intermediate node I_BC is included, with an alternative table for B and C.
The confidence table in A is a noisy-and between D and I_BC.
5.6 Sensitivity Analysis
We propose to perform a sensitivity analysis using a tornado graph. It is a simple sta-
tistical tool, which shows the positive or negative influence of basic elements on main
function. Basically, considering a function f(x1, ...xn), where values X1, ..., Xn of
the variables xi have been estimated, the tornado analysis consists in the estimation
for each xi ∈ [Xmin, Xmax], of the values f(X1, ..., Xi−1, Xmin, Xi+1, ...Xn) and
BConfidence network
A
B C C
Goal
Goal
D
Context
Safety case in GSN
D
A
Goal
<<complementary>>
Fig. 10. Mixed argumentation 1
f(X1, ..., Xi−1, Xmax, Xi+1, ...Xn), where Xmin and Xmax the maximum and mini-
mum admissible values of variables xi. Hence for each xi, we get an interval of possible
variations of function f . The tornado graph is a visual presentation with ordered inter-
vals. In our case, we estimate the intervals of g() with Xmin = 0 and Xmax = 1.
If we take the example of alternative argument, with arbitrary values q = 0.7 and
p = 0.9, we get the following table:
g(B) 0 1
g(C) 0 1 0 1
g(A) 0 0.7 0.9 0.97
If we choose the values of g(B) = 0.8 and g(C) = 0.7, the confidence table
leads to the value g(A) = 0.8572, also computed with the tool AgenaRisk3, presented
Figure 11. In this example, to determine the sensitivity to g(B), we keep all the values
C
Uncertainty
Confidence
A
14.28%
85.72%
20%
80%
30%
70%
B
Uncertainty
Confidence
Uncertainty
Confidence 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
g(B)
p
g(C)
q
0.8572
Fig. 11. (a) Example of an alternative argument with the tool Agenarisk and (b) Corresponding
Tornado graph
for p, q, and g(C), and only calculate the values g(A) for g(B) = 0 and g(B) = 1 (we
obtain the values 0.49 and 0.949).
The same approach is used for other variables p, q, and g(C). The result is presented
Figure 11 (b). In this tornado graph, g(B) appears to be the most influent parameter to
decrease or increase the confidence in A. The left part is between 0.49 and 0.872, which
3 http://www.agenarisk.com
means that if g(B) is equal to its lower limit, then the confidence in A could be reduced
to 0.49. On the opposite, with a maximum value of g(B), then confidence in A could
reach 0.949.
Such an analysis leads to identify some sensitive points in a confidence network.
This could be used to increase the confidence focusing first on the most positive sensi-
tive points, or to focus on the elements where confidence should never be decreased (to
consolidate the safety case confidence). Nevertheless, two main limits appear: it is not
possible to identify combination of confidence variations, and such a diagram does not
identify which variables are the easiest to increase. For instance, even if g(C) appears
to be less influent, it may be easier to increase its confidence than the one in g(B). Our
approach does not focus on those aspects, but they are important points to study.
6 Conclusion
This paper proposed a new approach for the definition and estimation of confidence in
a safety case. We argue that it is important to have a separation between the safety case
and the confidence case. Our aim is to analyze uncertainties that may be present in a
safety case, using a sensitivity analysis. Our approach is based on the Dempster-Shafer
theory for the definitions of confidence and uncertainty. But the constraint m(X,X) =
0, brings the main benefit of letting use mathematical tools, such as BBN. Hence, we
proposed for most common safety case models in GSN, some transformation rules into
a confidence network. We particularly introduce the use of noisy-or for alternative ar-
guments, and an adapted version of noisy-and for complementary arguments. An ex-
periment on a real case study of a rehabilitation robot [15] has been carried out [9]. A
confidence graph of 65 nodes has been identified with only two alternative arguments
(all the others were complementary). The complete analysis is still under development
but, we were able to compute the complete graph and get a tornado graph in few min-
utes with the AgenaRisk tool with consistent results. In this paper, we only focus on the
feasibility of a quantitative estimation of confidence, and its propagation in a confidence
network. But this is obviously completely dependent on the determination of the con-
fidence values themselves. As already mentioned, this important issue is not addressed
in this paper, but is part of our future work.
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